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Abstract 
Understanding  how  aesthetic  preferences  are  shared  among  individuals,  and  its
developmental time course, is a fundamental question in aesthetics. It has been shown that
semantic associations, in response to representational artworks, overlap more strongly among
individuals than those generated by abstract artworks and that the emotional valence of the
associations also overlaps more for representational artworks. This valence response may be
a key driver in aesthetic appreciation. The current study tested predictions derived from the
semantic association account in a developmental context. Twenty 4-, 6-, 8- and 10-year-old
children (n=80) were shown 20 artworks (10 representational, 10 abstract) and were asked to
rate  each  artwork  and  to  explain  their  decision.  Cross-observer  agreement  in  aesthetic
preferences increased with age from 4 to 8 years for both abstract and representational art.
However,  after  age  6  the  level  of  shared  appreciation  for  representational  and  abstract
artworks  diverged,  with significantly  higher  levels  of agreement  for  representational  than
abstract  artworks  at  age  8  and 10.   The most  common justifications  for  representational
artworks involved subject matter, while for abstract artworks formal artistic properties and
color were the most commonly used justifications. Representational artwork also showed a
significantly  higher  proportion  of  associations  and  emotional  responses  than  abstract
artworks. In line with predictions from developmental cognitive neuroscience, references to
the  artist  as  an agent  increased  between ages  4 and 6 and again  between ages  6 and 8,
following the development of Theory of Mind. The findings support the view that increased
experience  with  representational  content  during  the  life  span  reduces  inter-individual
variation in aesthetic appreciation and increases shared preferences. In addition, brain and
cognitive development appear to impact on art appreciation at milestone ages.
Key words: Empirical aesthetics, Convergence, Semantic association, Neurocognitive 
development, Meta-cognition, Emotion
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Introduction 
Evaluating  an  object’s  beauty  is  a  central  property  of  human  behavior  with  aesthetic
preferences developing in early infancy (Krentz and Earl, 2013), and influencing behavior in
a wide range of circumstances. Understanding how aesthetic judgements develop and what
determines aesthetic appreciation is an important challenge for psychologists (Gardner et al.,
1975;  Lin  and  Thomas,  2002;  Leder  et  al.,  2004;  Goskun  et  al.,  2014;  see  Lindell  and
Mueller,  2011 for a review).  A primary focus of this  research is  an examination,  from a
developmental perspective, of the hypothesis that a key driver in aesthetic appreciation is the
associative thoughts people have in response to the subject matter of an artwork (Vessel and
Rubin, 2010). 
Drawing on behavioral data, several influential theories of aesthetics have been developed,
(e.g. Martindale, 1984; Leder et al., 2004; Reber et al., 2004) and considerable progress has
been made to identify the visual properties of artworks and the attributes of the viewer that
influence aesthetic appreciation (Martindale,  1984; Leder,  et  al.  2004; Reber,  et  al.  2004;
Palmer et al., 2013). A key component of all theories of aesthetics is the idea that greater
understanding  in  the  viewer  reliably  enhances  aesthetic  appreciation  (Martindale,  1984;
Parsons 1987; Winston and Cupchik 1992; Zeki, 1999; Leder et al., 2004; Reber et al., 2004;
but see Belke et al.,  2015). This is supported by the finding that increased understanding
provided  by  titles  reliably  enhances  the  appreciation  of  photographs  (Millis,  2001)  and
artworks (Russell, 2003; Leder et al., 2006). Greater art expertise also increases the liking of
all  genres  of  artwork  (Leder  et  al.,  2012)  and  abstract  art  in  particular  (Gordon,  1952;
Winston  and  Cupchik  1992;  Hekkert  and  van  Wieringen,  1996)  presumably  because  art
expertise facilitates the understanding of the formal properties of art when representational
content is absent (Winston and Cupchik 1992; Lindell and Meuller, 2011). As Landau et al.
(2006) suggest, a lack of understanding in response to abstract art may be the primary reason
why naïve adult viewers consistently prefer representational to abstract art (Gordon, 1952;
Heinrichs and Cupchik, 1985; Winston and Cupchik, 1992; Mastandrea, 2011; see also Leder
et al., 2006; Leder, et al., 2012)
Although  understanding  is  important  to  aesthetic  appreciation  it  takes  time  to  develop
(Gardner et al., 1975; Parsons, 1987; Belke et al., 2010) and for naïve viewers of art, and
children,  research  suggests  that  aesthetic  appreciation  is  often  quite  rudimentary,  being
governed  by  a  few  primary  attributes  of  the  artwork,  such  as  subject  matter  and  color
(Gordon, 1952; Machotka, 1966; Parsons, 1987; Winston and Cupchik, 1992). In children
aesthetic appreciation also depends on their level of neurocognitive development, which will
limit the aspects of the artwork and intentions of the artist that they are able to process and
understand (see Callaghan and Rochat, 2003).  For example, aesthetic appreciation in infants
who are too young (< 1 year) to understand the representational nature of images is strongly
influenced by the color and the visual pattern of the artwork, as measured by their allocation
of  attention  (Cacchione  et  al.,  2011).  Once children  understand the  dual  representational
nature of pictures (i.e. that a picture is both an object itself and a symbol of something else;
Deloache and Burns, 1994) subject matter becomes more important in aesthetic appreciation
(Gordon, 1952; Machotka,  1966).  This is  mirrored in  the development  of children’s  own
drawing  ability,  which  progresses  from  non-representational  scribbling  towards  the
production of more realistic images (e.g., Golomb, 1992, 1994). It is likely, therefore, that
older  children  will  be  more  influenced  by  the  representational  content  of  the  artwork
(Taunton,  1980)  and with  the  increasing  ability  to  understand  the  perspectives  of  others
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mental states (Theory of Mind, Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Armitage and Allen, 2015) an
understanding of the artists’ intentions may also influence aesthetic appreciation.
Leder  et  al.  (2004)  proposed  that  basic  forms  of  aesthetic  understanding  can  involve
associative processes, with a viewer generating meaningful information that relates to them
because  the  artwork  triggers  an  association  with  something  they  have  experienced,
remembered,  or  of  which  they  are  aware.   The  associative  ideas  of  Leder  et  al.  (2004)
anticipate the work of Vessel and Rubin (2010; see also Biederman & Vessel, 2006) who
proposed that in naïve viewers shared thoughts in response to the content of an artwork have
a powerful role in aesthetic appreciation. They reached this conclusion from their finding that
the  aesthetic  appreciation  of  realistic  images  (photographs)  is  more  consistent  across
observers  than  for  abstract  images.  Vessel  and Rubin  propose that,  because  people  have
similar experiences in their lives (e.g. when on a beach, walking a dog, or in a car park),
when an image represents such a scene it causes similar thoughts in people which influence
their liking of the image. Therefore, they explain the greater consistency in representational
images  as  being  a  product  of  individuals  sharing  more  thoughts  and  evaluations  for
meaningful/realistic images (e.g. a scenic view) than they do for abstract images,  causing
preferences for the abstract images to be more variable across individuals.   In support of
Vessel  and  Rubin’s  theory,  Schepman,  Rodway,  Pullen  and  Kirkham,  (2015;  henceforth
Schepman et al 2015a) found, when they measured the valence of participant’s associations
in response to  abstract  and representational  artworks,  that  the valence of the associations
correlated with a participant’s liking of an artwork, and both liking and association valence
were  more  consistent  across  observers  for  representational  than  abstract  art.  Moreover,
associations  in  response to  representational  art  showed greater  semantic  similarity  across
participants than associations in response to abstract art (Schepman, Rodway & Pullen, 2015,
henceforth Schepman et al. 2015b).
Vessel  and  Rubin’s  theory  suggests  that  associative  thoughts  are  a  major  influence  in
aesthetic evaluations in naïve viewers and determine the consistency of aesthetic preferences
across individuals. It can also be expected that over time children will be repeatedly exposed
to items in the world that reliably elicit positive experiences (e.g., certain animals, scenes), so
that when those items are re-presented as an image they should elicit a positive association.
Research  suggests  that  children  develop  the  capacity  to  understand  graphic  images  as
representational symbols towards the end of the third year of life (e.g.,  Callaghan, 1999),
causing pictures  to become commonplace in adult-child  interactions  both at  home and in
educational  settings (e.g.,  through story book reading;  Szechter  and Liben,  2004, Danko-
Mcghee and Slutsky, 2011). If Vessel and Rubin are correct, the association children have
developed  with  the  subject  matter  of  a  representational  picture  should  influence  their
appreciation of the picture, and as children will have been exposed to particular items more
often as they get older, the strength of the association (and similarity in preference), should
also grow stronger with age for representational artworks but not abstract artworks.
Vessel  and  Rubin’s  theory  and  Schepman  et  al.’s  results  indicate  an  important  role  for
associations  in  aesthetic  appreciation,  but  very  little  research  has  directly  examined
associations  in  the  development  of  aesthetic  preferences.  There  is  some  evidence  from
unstructured  interviews that  associations  might  be important  for  aesthetic  appreciation  in
young children, with the associations frequently being idiosyncratic but driven by the content
(e.g. “giraffe’s back ... a dog’s face”, for Picasso’s ‘Girl Before a Mirror’) (Housen, 2002),
but the majority of research has emphasized other factors.  For example, in Parsons’ (1987)
influential work he interviewed children on their appreciation of artworks and concluded that
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there  were  five  successive  stages  of  aesthetic  understanding,  starting  from  a  basic  and
rudimentary understanding to a more complex and detailed appreciation. In stage 1 color and
subject  matter  were  of  primary  importance  in  determining  a  young  child’s  liking  of  an
artwork (see also Lin and Thomas, 2002) and children in later stages were concerned with
how accurately the picture represented the world (stage 2), the expressiveness and emotions
elicited by the artwork (stage 3), and the medium, style, formal properties, organization and
artist’s intentions (stage 4).  However, associations were not explicitly listed by Parsons as
having a particularly powerful influence on aesthetic appreciation in any of the five stages.
Despite this, Parsons observed that some content resulted in a high level of agreement in
aesthetic evaluation, particularly for children in stage 1, with nearly all the children liking a
particular artwork because it featured a dog.  Similarly Danko-McGhee and Slutsky (2011)
and DeSantis and Housen (2009) found that children liked certain artworks because of the
content (e.g. fish, dogs, etc.), which they describe as a process of ‘simple association’, and
Freeman and Sanger (1995) found that the majority of children thought a picture would be
bad if it depicted something that was ugly. These findings support the view that aesthetic
preferences for representational art can be remarkably consistent if the thoughts and emotions
elicited by the artwork’s content are relatively similar across individuals.
Parson’s work was developed further by Lin and Thomas (2002) who examined aesthetic
preferences in children (4-5 years, 7-9 years, 12-14 years), and adults (non-art undergraduate
students, art and design students), for artworks from five genres (abstract, fine, contemporary,
humorous, and cartoon). For each genre participants were presented with five artworks and
were asked to select the artwork they most liked, and then describe what the picture was
about and why they liked it. Lin and Thomas then classified the participant’s statements into
nine categories (e.g. subject matter, color, form, association etc.) to examine how frequently
different types of justification were mentioned by participants when explaining their choice.
They concluded from their findings that the development of aesthetic understanding did not
follow the strict  sequence of stages that Parsons originally  proposed, but could branch in
different  directions  and  that  understanding  and  preferences  changed  with  age.  Only  art
students showed different reactions for the different genres of art, showing that naïve viewers
have  relatively  similar  responses  irrespective  of  the  genre  and  that  exposure  to,  and
knowledge  of  art,  is  crucial  to  the  nature  of  the  aesthetic  experience  and  the  depth  of
processing achieved (Winston and Cupchik, 1992; Augustin and Leder, 2006; Leder et al.,
2014). In agreement with other studies subject matter and color were frequently mentioned
and were of primary importance for aesthetic appreciation in all  groups (Machotka 1966;
Rump and Southgate, 1967; Rosentiel et al., 1978; Bell and Bell, 1979), though color was
very important for the youngest group and declined somewhat with increased age. Finally,
despite  having an ‘association’  coding category,  few participants  referred  to  associations
when explaining their preferences. 
It  is  possible,  however,  that  the  infrequent  reference  to  associations  was due to  Lin  and
Thomas’ procedure of requiring participants to select a particular artwork and then explain
their justification. If a few attributes determine liking in most instances (e.g. subject matter,
color, artistic properties) then most of the artworks will have been chosen on the basis of
these  attributes  (and  will  also  have  been  the  participant’s  justification  for  their  choice).
Therefore, asking participants to select the artwork might have limited the complexity and
range of participant’s justifications for their aesthetic preferences, and prevented the detection
of  less  salient  influences  on  choice.  We  aimed  to  overcome  this  limitation  by  asking
participants to explain their level  of liking for an artwork without the artwork being pre-
selected by the participant.
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It  is  also apparent  from the literature  that  the extent  to which responses to  artworks are
viewed as associations varies markedly but is crucial to whether findings are interpreted as
supporting Vessel and Rubin’s theory. It is possible that Lin and Thomas (2002) did not find
a large role for associations because they used a specific definition, of ‘being reminded of
material’.  If a broader concept of associations is adopted to refer to interpretive thoughts
(with a valence) generated by the content of an artwork then it appears that those thoughts
may determine liking in naïve viewers (Parsons, 1987; Freeman and Sanger, 1995; DeSantis
and Housen, 2009).  It  is  this  concept  of associations  that  we subscribe to and which we
believe might cause the earlier  development of shared preferences for representational art
than abstract art. It also corresponds to Vessel and Rubin’s (2010) description of semantic
associations, which are an interpretation of the image’s content, and are distinct from other
low-level perceptual associations that can be elicited by the physical features of an the image.
An example  of  a  semantic  association  would  be  thoughts  of  a  ‘holiday’  elicited  by  the
depiction of a beach, or ‘shopping/work’ from an image of a car park, while a perceptual
association might be thoughts of ‘hard’ or ‘cold’ in response to the particular lines or colors
of an image. It is important to note that a semantic association is not a simple reiteration of
the subject matter but has a level of interpretation of the image, and which Vessel and Rubin
suggest are elicited much more readily by representational images than abstract images. 
The  development  of  aesthetic  preferences  towards  different  styles  of  artwork  was  also
examined very recently by Schabmann et al. (2015) in a study whose publication occurred
when our own empirical work was already complete. They asked children (age 4-6 and 9-11)
to rate different styles of artworks on four dimensions, namely liking, valence, understanding,
arousal) and categorized the children’s verbal responses to questions about their evaluation of
the artwork. They found that emotion was an important determinant of liking at all ages, but
particularly for the younger children, with older children’s evaluations becoming increasingly
cognitively based.
Our study aimed to test, in primary school children (aged 4, 6, 8 and 10) predictions derived
from Vessel and Rubin’s (2010) theory of shared aesthetic preferences, whilst also building
on the work of Lin and Thomas (2002). We gathered liking data using a quantitative liking
scale, in addition to recording children’s verbal justifications of their aesthetic evaluations.
This  represented  a  balanced  approach,  in  which  all  children  could  communicate  their
evaluations  relatively  independently  of  language  ability,  as  well  as  providing  their  own
reasoning for these evaluations which would not be revealed through a forced choice task. 
Of focal interest to the association theory, our first hypothesis was that shared liking would
emerge  more  strongly at  older  ages  for  representational  as  opposed to  abstract  artworks,
strengthening the view that thoughts triggered by the subject matter are an important driver in
aesthetic  appreciation.  Based  on  the  findings  of  previous  research  (Trautner,  2008),  our
second hypothesis was that a preference for representational art would emerge at older ages,
potentially because older children are increasingly influenced by the representational content
of the artworks in the same way that adults are (e.g. Landau et al., 2006). In relation to the
justifications provided, it was expected that a greater range and complexity of reasons would
emerge with advancing age, due to a more sophisticated understanding of art underpinned by
neurocognitive development, which, in turn, may drive aesthetic development (hypothesis 3).
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We treated the justification data on an exploratory basis, and thus without formal hypotheses.
We  explored  whether  subject  matter,  associations,  understanding  and  interpretation,  and
mood  and  emotions  played  a  stronger  role  in  the  justifications  for  representational  than
abstract artwork. Based on prior work, we also explored whether color and subject matter
would be mentioned particularly frequently in the justifications for the aesthetic ratings (e.g.
Gardner  et  al.  1975;  Parsons,  1987;  Lin  and Thomas,  2002).  We also  aimed  to  explore
whether color and other formal artistic properties would be more prominent in justifications
for abstract than for representational art. We made a number of further observations which
we linked to aesthetic and general neurocognitive development.  These are reported in the
Results. 
Method
Participants 
Eighty children from a National Curriculum Primary school in Cheshire participated in the
study. The school’s achievement levels were approximately average (1% below the national
mean) for the year in which testing took place. Ethical approval was received from the Ethics
Committee  of  the  Department  of  Psychology,  University  of  Chester,  and  complied  with
British Psychological Society ethical guidelines. The school head teacher gave provisional
consent  for the study to take place and participants  were then recruited from classrooms
teaching 4-, 6-, 8- and 10-year-old children via parental opt-out consent. Of those available to
take  part  in  the  study,  the  class  teacher  selected  twenty  children  from each  age  group.
Teachers were instructed not to choose children who had particular experience or interest in
the visual arts.  All children verbally assented to take part and none refused to participate.
The characteristics of the sample were as follows: 4-year-olds (mean age 4.7, SD 3 months;
15 males and 5 females); 6-year-olds (mean age 6.4, SD 4 months; 8 males, 12 females); 8-
year-olds (mean age 8.7, SD 3 months; 10 males, 10 females); 10-year-olds (mean age 10.6;
SD 4 months; 10 males, 10 females). 
Materials
An initial set of forty artworks (20 representational and 20 abstract) was selected by authors
PR, AS and JK, following image searches on the internet. This initial set was developed from
the set used in Schepman et al. (2015a, Experiment 1), with the replacement of some abstract
artworks,  with  an  aim  of  enhancing  the  variation  in  responses  in  the  abstract  set.  The
artworks selected were not famous to reduce the risk that viewers had already seen the work
and had a pre-formed opinion. We included in our classification of representational artworks
those  that  depicted  real-life  entities  without  gross  distortions  in  shape  or  color.  Abstract
artworks could not contain any recognizable objects or scenes, but we did include artworks
which contained recognizable shapes. 
Undergraduate student raters provided pre-test ratings on a seven-point scale of the artworks’
attractiveness,  colorfulness,  interest,  liking,  and negativity/positivity  (see Schepman et  al.
2015a for fuller details of the procedure, which matches the current procedure). Based on this
pre-test, we selected 20 artworks, 10 representational and 10 abstract (see Appendix 1), as we
felt that would be the maximum that very young children would be able to work with. This is
consistent with the number of artworks presented to children in previous studies including
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Machotka  (1966)  and  Lin  and  Thomas  (2002).  In  our  selection,  we  ensured  that  any
differences in ratings in the larger set of forty artworks were also present in the selection. We
present the descriptive statistical properties of the selected 20 artworks (10 per art type) in
Table 1, based on ratings by 23 student raters.
--- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE –--
All  artworks  were  reproduced  in  high  quality  color  print  on  white  A4  paper  and  were
presented in a  booklet.  Three versions of this  booklet  were prepared with three different
randomized orders of the artworks that were counterbalanced across participants to prevent
any order effects. Alongside the booklet, participants were presented with a rating sheet. On
the rating sheet pictures of 1,2,3,4, and 5 stars were shown labeled with the corresponding
number. Star charts are commonly used as part of educational reward systems (e.g., Kazdin,
2001) and the idea of more stars representing greater liking would be familiar to participants,
helping  to  locate  their  understanding  of  the  task  within  a  familiar  and  concrete  context.
Liking is also ‘the dimension that best captures the aesthetic response’ (Schabmann et al.,
2015),  and  the  star  rating  may  have  ameliorated  some  of  the  difficulties  reported  by
Schabmann et al. (2015) when testing kindergarten children with a 9 point Likert scale.
Procedure
All participants were tested individually by author JK at a desk in a quiet room next to their
usual classroom. 
The study was introduced to each child as follows: “We see pictures every day, for example
in books and on walls at school and at home. We may like some pictures more than we like
others. Today I am interested in what pictures you like. There is no right or wrong answer; I
just want you to tell me what you think of each picture that I show you.” Participants were
also instructed that they could ask for a break at any time during the procedure. Each artwork
in the booklet was presented sequentially to the participants with the following instruction
repeated for each of the 20 artworks “I would like to know how much you like this picture.
Would you give it 1 star (you don’t like the picture at all), 2 stars (you think the picture is ok
but that are some parts that you don’t like), 3 stars (the picture is good. You like it), 4 stars
(the picture is very good. You like it a lot) or 5 stars? (The picture is excellent.  You love it).”
Participants were then instructed to point to the number of stars that they wanted to give the
artwork on the star rating sheet. If necessary the instructions were repeated. 
After indicating their rating for each individual artwork participants were then asked ‘why
did you give that picture 1-5 stars?” The instruction was repeated as necessary to elicit  a
response  and  any  queries  raised  by  the  participants  were  answered  as  follows:  “I  am
interested to know the reasons why you gave this picture 1-5 stars. There is no right or
wrong answer. I only want to know what you think about the picture.” Due to the potentially
limited verbal abilities of some of the children, three additional categories of prompts were
used by JK to support and clarify participant’s responses. Firstly, for basic responses without
any explanation (for e.g., ‘I like it’) participants were prompted by asking ‘why?’ or ‘what?’
questions to elicit further detail. Secondly, if participants were explaining a concept but were
unable to retrieve the appropriate word to describe it (or used the incorrect word), then JK
provided the correct word (e.g. “calf”). Finally, if participants provided an explanation with
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reference to part of a picture but it was unclear what part they were referring to, JK asked
participants to clarify this. 
To keep the timeframe of the study manageable  for  primary  school  children  each of  the
twenty  artworks  was  presented  to  the  participant  for  a  maximum  of  5  minutes.  All
justifications were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis. It is possible that participants
may have been able to give more detailed responses with additional questioning from JK,
However this may have increased the possibility of interviewer bias.  Limiting the questions
posed about the artwork also ensured that the justifications given were the most salient to the
participants within the time allocated to each picture.
Results
Rating data
Cross-rater agreement as a function of art type and age group
In relation  to  our  first  hypothesis,  that  convergence of ratings  across  individuals  may be
greater  for  representational  than  abstract  art,  derived from Vessel  and Rubin  (2010)  and
building on Schepman et al. (2015a), we report the convergence of ratings as a function of art
type and age group first. Following the method used in Schepman et al. (2015a), participants’
star ratings were analyzed for cross-rater agreement using non-parametric Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficients, in which each participant’s rating for each artwork was correlated
with the ratings given by all other participants. These correlation matrices were generated
separately for each age group and art type. The sets of correlation coefficients thus obtained
were compared for differences between art types in each age group, using non-parametric
pairwise  comparisons,  namely  Wilcoxon  signed-rank  tests,  to  test  whether  cross-rater
agreement differed as a function of art type in the different age groups. Mean correlation
coefficients as a function of age group and art type are shown in Figure 1. 
--- INSERT REVISED FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE – Caption at end of manuscript---
From these data, it is clear that the children at age 4 showed very low inter-rater agreement
for both abstract (mean rho = .04, SD = .33) and representational art (mean rho = .01, SD
= .33), and their agreement did not differ significantly as a function of art type (Z = -.88, p
= .38). At age 6, the mean correlation coefficients were somewhat higher (mean rho = .14,
SD = .31 for abstract; mean rho = .17, SD = .32 for representational art), but they did not
differ  significantly  as  a  function  of  art  type  Z  =  -1.11,  p  =  .27).  The  agreement  for
representational art was markedly higher at age 8 (mean rho = .26, SD = .31) and age 10
(mean rho = .32; SD = .30), and the agreement for abstract somewhat higher than in the
younger age groups at age 8 (mean rho = .16, SD = .33) and age 10 (mean rho = .17, SD
= .35).  Importantly, at ages 8 and 10 there were significant differences in agreement as a
function of art type, with children agreeing significantly more with their peers on their ratings
of representational artwork than abstract artwork, (at age 8, Z = -2.89, p = .004; at age 10, Z =
-3.75, p < .001). Thus, based on these data, it seems that a higher level of convergence for
representational  artwork  than  for  abstract  artworks  can  be  observed  from age  8,  and  it
continues to be observed at age 10. This supports our first hypothesis.
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Not focally related to our hypotheses, but at the request of a reviewer and of likely help with
the interpretation of the overall pattern, we also report the effects of age on the correlations.
As main effects, the correlations increased significantly with age for both abstract (Friedman
Χ2  (3)  = 18.22, p < .001) and representational artworks (Friedman  Χ2  (3)  = 68.70, p < .001).
Further  pairwise Wilcoxon tests showed that for abstract art, the correlations only increased
significantly when comparing age 4 to age 6 (Z = -3.198, p = .001), but not for the other
adjacent age pairs (Z > -.5, p > . 6), while for representational art, convergence rose between
ages  4 and 6 (Z = -4.385, p < .001),  6  and 8 (Z = -2.385, p = .017),  but  the rise  only
approached significance between ages 8 and 10 (Z = -1.764, p = .078).
Ratings by art type and age group
To test  hypothesis  2 and to  gain insight  into age trends  in  overall  liking of abstract  and
representational art, star ratings were averaged for each child and each art type. One data
point from one participant was missing as it had not been collected, but this was estimated
using the mean of the condition for that child. Resulting means and standard deviations for
each age group and condition are presented in Table 2.  At the request of a reviewer, we
report  the  inferential  statistics  against  an  alpha  of  .05/4  =  .0125,  by  way of  Bonferroni
correction  for  multiple  comparisons,  while  reporting  the original  p-values  yielded by the
inferential tests in Table 2. These analyses showed some preference trends, which appeared
to show a stronger liking for abstract art at age 6, and a stronger liking for representational art
at age 10, but these were not significant against the corrected alpha. Thus, the data did not
provide support for hypothesis 2.
--- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE –--
Justifications
Transcription 
Two independent raters (authors JL and AL) transcribed participants’ verbal responses for
each artwork. Each rater transcribed the verbal responses of half of the participants within
each  age  group.  Transcription  was verbatim and the  raters  were  blind  to  the  age  of  the
participants. 
Development and refinement of the coding scheme
To classify  and quantify  participants’  verbal  justifications  for  their  preferences  an initial
coding scheme was developed by JK, PR and AS which included 16 of the most prominently
used categories drawn from a review of relevant literature (e.g., Machotka, 1966; Parsons,
1987;  Lin and Thomas,  2002) as  well  as from JK’s direct  experience  of listening to  the
participants responses. 
The initial categories were discussed individually with each coder (authors JL and AL), and a
booklet was produced defining and explaining the categories as well as giving illustrative
examples of potential quotes which could exemplify these. A sample of ten participants was
randomly selected from the data set and each rater was instructed to individually code this set
of responses using the initial coding scheme. 
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Following the initial coding, all authors met to discuss and evaluate the level of agreement
within the provisional sample and to discuss the coders’ understanding and use of the coding
scheme. Following this discussion, to achieve the most parsimonious scheme, two categories
were deleted because they overlapped with other criteria and thus did not represent a unique
basis for justifications.  The final simplified coding scheme included the 14 categories which
are outlined in Table 3. It is to be particularly noted that we had to demarcate associations
from subject matter in a precise way to ensure coding reliability. 
--- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE –--
Coding
Authors  JL  and  AL  used  the  14-item  coding  scheme  to  classify  participants’  verbal
justifications for their ratings of the 20 artworks. They initially coded the justifications that
they had previously transcribed as this ensured a high degree of familiarity with the data.
They coded for the presence vs. absence of the categories for each child’s response to each
artwork, but not the number of times that a particular category arose within each individual
justification. Participants’ verbal justifications could fall within more than one category, and
all  categories  that  were  relevant  for  that  individual  justification  were  documented.  The
category “Basic Liking” was only used if  no other reasons were given, and the category
“Other” was used only when none of the other categories applied. Following initial coding of
half the data, coders blindly coded the other half of the sample, and agreement was checked.
If the two coders had a disagreement, they jointly revisited the conflicting code and reached
agreement  by discussion.  In some instances,  the coding disagreements  were simple entry
errors, and these were repaired. Analysis of all 1600 justifications showed that in 92.9% of
the justifications, the raters agreed on all 14 codes chosen, while in 7.1% of justifications,
they needed to discuss one or more codes to reach agreement on the overall coding of the
justification.  This was a good level  of agreement,  indicating that the coding scheme was
usable, reliable and valid.
Number of categories used in justifications
As children age and language and cognition develop, it is conceivable that they are able to
provide  more  complex,  multi-faceted  justifications  for  their  ratings  of  artworks.  To  see
whether, as predicted by hypothesis 3, this was the case in our data, we calculated the mean
number of justifications provided per child, and subjected this to a Kruskal-Wallis test with
age group as the independent variable. This showed that the number of categories rose as a
function of age, with four-year-olds providing 1.2 categories on average, six-year-olds 1.4,
and both eight-year-olds and ten-year-olds 2.0. This increase was significant, Χ2 (3) = 42.895,
p < .001. To examine where the increase differed significantly between adjacent age groups,
follow-up Mann-Whitney tests were run, and these showed that the increment between ages 6
and 8 was the only significant contrast, Z = -4.224, p < .001. This suggests a possible step-
change in the complexity of the justifications between ages 6 and 8. This supports hypothesis
3, and indicates the ages across which the complexity increases most.
Frequency of coding categories
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As observed, children used a higher number of codes in older age groups. To further examine
how the different categories were used by the children across the two types of artwork as a
function of age, the mean frequency of usage of the 14 coding categories was calculated as a
percentage  of  the total  of  the number  of  opportunities  for  each  child  and art  type.   The
resulting means can be seen in Table 4, with visualization of the most common codes in
Figure 2.
--- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE –--
---INSERT NEW FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ---
The most frequent codes, which were used at a frequency of 10% or greater collapsing over
age  groups  and  art  type,  were  formal  artistic  properties,  color,  subject  matter,  and
understanding / interpretation.  The other codes were used more sparingly by the children,
though associations reached 9% overall.
Overall age effects on frequency of usage of coding categories
Using Kruskal-Wallis tests with the frequency of usage of a coding category per child as the
dependent variable and age group as the independent variable, it was found that there were
significant effects of age on the use of some codes, namely, formal artistic properties, Χ2 (3) =
38.3, p < .001, with an increasing use with age, which was significant on a Mann-Whitney
comparison between ages 4 and 6, Z = -3.304, p = .001, and ages 6 and 8,  Z = -2.936, p
= .003) but not ages 8 and 10. Further, reference to the artist, Χ2 (3) = 25.7, p < .001, also
increased, with two significant increments between ages 4 and 6, Z = -2.080, p = .038, and 6
and 8, Z = -2.687, p = .017, but not 8 and 10. Understanding and interpretation, Χ2 (3) = 26.3,
p < .001, also increased with age, with the age 6 to age 8 increment being the only significant
one, Z = -2.769, p = .006. Comparison also showed an age effect, Χ2 (3) = 26.2, p < .001, with
a sharp increase between ages 6 and 8, again the only significant increment in usage, Z = -
3.789, p < .001.  Perceptual fluency, Χ2 (3) = 15.78, p = .001, showed no usage at all for ages 4
– 8, with a sudden onset of usage at age 10, which was significant, Z = -2.354, p = .019. 
Some categories showed downward trends. Usage of basic liking dropped significantly across
the age groups, Χ2 (3) = 13.35, p = .004, with the most pronounced drop occurring between
ages  4 and 6,  though this  contrast  did not quite  reach significance  on a pairwise Mann-
Whitney comparison. “Other” showed a similar numerical trend, but this was not significant.
As these categories were used by the coders when no other labels applied, this is likely to be
due to the use of other labels.
Justification category usage in abstract vs. representational artwork
The data showed that the use of categories varied by art type. The mean percentage use for
the  two art  types,  collapsing  across  the  age  groups,  are  shown in  Figure  3.  A series  of
Wilcoxon signed rank tests was run to test whether the main effect of art type on usage of
each category was significant. In four categories, justifications were used significantly more
frequently as a justification of a rating of representational than abstract artworks. These were
subject matter, Z = 7.659, p < .001; associations, Z = -4.572, p < .001; mood and emotion, Z
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= 4.462, p < .001; and history and culture, Z = 3.530, p < .001.  Two patterns differed in the
opposite direction.  It  was found that justifications featuring color were significantly more
common in abstract than representational artwork, Z = 7.369, p < .001, as were justifications
featuring  formal  artistic  properties,  Z  = -4.951,  p  < .001.  No other  contrasts  reached or
approached significance. 
--- INSERT RENUMBERED FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE – Caption at end of
manuscript---
Because there is no standard statistical test for non-parametric data that is equivalent to the
factorial interaction in ANOVA, we tested for interactions by entering all trials separately
(not averaged by subject), and running Chi-Square tests, with Age Group and Art Type as
factors.  These showed only one significant  interaction  pattern,  namely  for  formal  artistic
properties, Χ2 (3) = 18.333, p < .001. Further analysis of this main effect using four Wilcoxon
tests  (one  for  each  age  group)  showed  that  the  difference  between  abstract  and
representational  artwork  was  significant  in  all  age  groups,  except  at  age  10,  where  the
difference in the same direction narrowly missed significance. In all other categories, the Chi-
Square tests did not reach significance. This confirms the patterns that can also be seen in the
means, that the effect of art type on category usage was stable across the age groups.
Discussion
A number of important results were obtained that are central to furthering the understanding
of the development of children’s aesthetic appreciation. The most noteworthy was a greater
shared liking for representational artworks compared to abstract artworks at age 8 and 10.
This finding was in line with our primary hypothesis and will be discussed shortly. We also
observed a wider range of aesthetic justifications than previously identified and a general
increase  of  justifications  with  age.  Finally,  we  observed  a  clear  pattern  of  different
justifications as a function of art type which was stable across the age groups. 
Convergence as a function of art type and age
The result central to the aims of this research is the finding that significantly greater shared
liking  was  present  at  ages  8  and  10  for  representational  art  compared  to  abstract  art,
supporting our first  and primary hypothesis.  This  finding was predicted  from Vessel  and
Rubin’s theory and, as noted previously, can be explained in terms of older children having
developed similar thoughts in response to the artwork’s subject matter and which influenced
their liking in systematic and predictable ways.  We are not aware of an alternative theory of
aesthetics that would have predicted, or could explain, this finding. The lack of convergence
in preference for representational artworks in younger children is in agreement with the view
that it takes time to develop preferences and associations in relation to the depicted subject
matter. 
However,  there  are  alternative  possible  explanations  for  the  lack  of  or  lower  level  of
convergence with abstract art that we must consider. At a young age, evaluations of art may
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not yet be stable,  in that  children might  not give the same responses from test  to re-test
(Pugach et al., 2014). Pugach et al. found that younger children (3-6 years) show less stability
in aesthetic judgment than older children (7-9 years), meaning that individual ratings may be
more “random” in a younger child compared to an older child. Another possibility is that
young children  simply  do not  know how to use rating  scales.  An inspection  of  the  data
suggests that it is possible that at age 4 such an explanation may hold, because convergence
was very low for both art types at that age. However, convergence increases for both abstract
and  representational  art  between  ages  4  and  6,  and  then  continues  to  rise  for  only
representational art between ages 6 and 8, with a further non-significant trend between ages 8
and 10. This difference in the rise in convergence as a function of art type is not compatible
with an explanation in which there is a general inability to provide stable judgments or to use
a rating scale, as under such an explanation, convergence should not increase for either type
of artwork. Thus, the difference in convergence between abstract and representational art at
ages  8  and  10  seems  more  likely  to  be  evidence  of  a  shared  liking  via  meanings  and
associations for representational artworks only, in line with Vessel and Rubin (2010) and
Schepman et al.  (2015) than for a generalized instability in using the ratings, particularly
from age 6 upwards.
A potentially profound implication of this finding is that similar patterns of shared liking can
be expected for the development of children’s preferences toward other items, such as toys,
consumer items and foods. These preferences may show a different developmental trajectory,
depending  on the  nature  of  the  item,  consistency of  exposure and strength  of  emotional
response, but, based on these results we predict that the development of convergence in liking
is a general (and measurable) phenomenon.  In addition, if Vessel and Rubin’s (2010) theory
is correct then it  might account  for the development  of shared liking in a wide range of
circumstances.  For  instance,  if  repeated  exposure  to  items  in  the  world  elicits  similar
experiences in people, which comprise similar thoughts and emotions, then this may be an
important way in which children develop shared meanings and values about the world. A
potential mechanism by which associations between entities in the real world and affective
interpretations of those entities are formed could include statistical learning (Saffran et al.,
1996; Kushnir et al., 2013). We will return to other predictions from this theory when we
consider the verbal justifications, shortly.
Art type preference
We note that  in  our second hypothesis  we expected ratings  for representational  art  to be
higher  than  those  for  abstract  art  in  the  older  age  group,  but  we  did  not  obtain  strong
statistical evidence for this. It is possible that this analysis suffered from a lack of statistical
power. Compared to the adult data reported in Table 1 and in Schepman et al. (2015a) we
used a narrower rating scale (1-5 stars for the children, 1-7 points for the adults). This was
based on our prior evaluation that children would be more able to cope with a five-star rating
system than one which had seven points, in part because children may have used such star
ratings in their daily lives (e.g. on reviews for books or games etc.). The narrower scale may
have reduced measurement sensitivity and statistical power in this part of the data set. We
exercise  caution  in  evaluating  hypothesis  2 due to  this  issue,  which makes it  difficult  to
distinguish between a genuine null effect and a type II error.
Verbal justifications
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The three most common categories used to justify ratings were formal artistic  properties,
color, and subject matter, which are the same as those identified by Lin and Thomas (2002;
note that their term for our formal artistic properties is “medium”). Additional justifications
also influenced the children’s preferences, which were not detected to a significant extent by
Lin and Thomas, and included understanding and interpretation, associations, and references
to  the  artist  (11.8%,  9%  and,  6.2%  of  usage  frequency,  respectively).  Therefore  our
methodology appears to have been able to identify the most important categories whilst also
being sensitive at detecting nuances in the multi-faceted nature of aesthetic justifications that
have  not  been  observed  before.  To  a  substantial  degree  the  properties  of  the  artwork
determined  the  justifications  the  children  gave  for  liking  an  artwork,  so  that  there  were
systematic and predictable differences between the types of art (see also Lin and Thomas,
2002). There were also clear effects of age. The remainder of the findings will be discussed in
two  subsections,  namely  the  effect  of  art  type  on  frequency  of  use  of  the justification
categories, and the effect of age on the number and type of justification categories used.
Usage of the categories as a function of art type
Representational artworks appear to be liked because of what they depict.  Subject matter,
associations,  mood  and  emotion,  and  history  and  culture  were  used  more  frequently  as
justifications for evaluations of representational than abstract artworks. Although associations
were  provided  as  justifications  significantly  more  for  representational  than  for  abstract
artworks,  they  were  not  common,  occurring  with  an  overall  frequency  of  12.9  %  for
representational  art.  This  is  a  much higher  frequency  than obtained by Lin  and Thomas
(2002), perhaps because our definition was slightly broader than theirs, but it is lower than
would  be  expected  if  associations  have  an  important  influence  on  liking  and  shared
preferences. 
The apparently limited incidence of associative thoughts is likely to be a product of how we
defined the category of associations to capture memories and personal experiences, whilst
being distinct from the category of subject matter, which required its own category to ensure
coding reliability. As explained in the results section this was needed to implement a reliable
coding scheme that made a distinction between aspects of associative thoughts and subject
matter. The data show that for representational art subject matter is overwhelmingly the most
frequent  justification  mentioned  (69%),  showing that  thoughts  in  response to  the  subject
matter determined liking more than any other aspect of the representational artwork. It is
probable, therefore, that some justifications that were based on semantic interpretations of the
artwork’s content will have been categorized as subject matter rather than associations. For
example, in response to artwork 5 (5: Mark Peterson: '55 T-Bird), which depicts a car on a
beach, a child gave the artwork one star “Cos there's a car on it”. This does not explicitly
reveal  memories  or  personal  experiences  and  was  therefore  not  coded  as  showing
associations, but nevertheless indicates that the subject matter was interpreted negatively and
this drove the rating. Similarly, for artwork 6 (Jay Kemp: Return to Sender), which depicts a
dog swimming with a stick in its mouth, one child gave the justification “I like it cos the
dog’s fetching the thing”, clearly  illustrating  an interpretation  beyond simply naming the
most salient object. Instead, the responses reveal more complex interpretative processes, with
different viewers selecting different aspects of the subject matter in their justifications. Such
interpretations were also observed by Schepman, et al. (2015b) with adult participants. While
these examples were not coded as an association under our definition, they are in agreement
with the idea that interpretive thoughts elicited by the subject matter determine liking (e.g.
Leder  et  al.  2004; Schepman et  al.  2015; Vessel  and Rubin,  2010).  Therefore,  while  the
15
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
infrequent  use  of  associations  as  a  justification  category  appears  to  cast  doubt  on  the
suggested  role  of  associative  thoughts  in  liking,  we  believe  this  is  an  unavoidable
consequence of the need for our coding scheme to be reliable.  This very interesting issue
could be further  explored in future studies  by the use of  a  more  quantitative  analysis  of
semantic associations, for example using the method devised by Schepman et al. (2015b). 
Abstract artworks appear to be liked for their colors and formal artistic properties, as these
were  more  frequently  used  as  justifications  for  abstract  than  representational  work.  It  is
apparent, therefore, that even young children were sensitive to the visual properties of the art
and that these seemed to play more of a role in the evaluation of abstract than representational
art, perhaps because, in the absence of discernible subject matter, color and formal properties
such as line and composition are more salient (Jolley and Thomas, 1994). This result echoes
observations by Gardner et al. (1975), who noted that 4- and 5-year-olds liked abstract art
because of the ‘pretty colors’ and  ‘nice design’. Interestingly, we found some evidence of
children  attempting  to  impose  meanings  or  associations  on  abstract  art,  which  was  also
observed by Gardner et al. (1975). Such ‘romancing’ can also be seen in the early stages of
children’s own drawing productions where representational intentions may frequently change
(Golomb, 1982, 1992). 
As evidenced in Schepman, et al. (2015b), in adult viewers there appears to be some shared
meaning in response to abstract works (see also Vessel and Rubin, 2010). The responses
made  by  the  children  in  the  current  study  also  showed  some  overlap  alongside  the
hypothesized  idiosyncrasy  in  interpretation.  For  example,  in  response  to  artwork  15
(Stephanie Kordan Dardashti: Desire Red)  one child’s justification was “I like the leaves”,
and a further child offered “... the leaves are covering the middle…”, another “… it's like
fire”, and another “…like an Indian campfire…”, while another stated “...like a city”. This
overlap  in  meaning  (leaves,  fire),  with  some idiosyncrasy  (city)  and  a  larger  number  of
responses not related to subject matter at all illustrates the pattern found more widely in the
current  data.  The question  to  what  extent  any semantic  interpretations  of abstract  art  are
shared  across  children  seems  an  interesting  line  to  investigate  in  more  detail  in  future
research, because it may provide an insight into children’s interpretation of visual language.
Effects of age on justification categories
As  predicted  in  hypothesis  3,  an  age-related  increase  in  the  variety  and  complexity  of
justifications was found (on average 1.2 categories were used at 4 years, 1.4 at 6 years, and 2
categories at 8 and 10 years), which a significant increase from ages 6 to 8.  Moreover, there
was no loss of justifications across the ages, but a general expansion of the categories, with
an increased role for cognitive  processes (see also Schabmann et  al.,  2015).  The notable
increase in the complexity of justifications from 6 to 8 suggests a rapid development in the
number  of  factors  that  influence  aesthetic  appreciation  across  this  age  boundary.  A
developmental explanation is offered by Machotka (1966), who reported similar results and
suggested  that  this  is  analogous  to  the  transition  between  pre-operational  and  concrete
operational thought in Piaget’s (1947) theory of intellectual development. Undoubtedly part
of  the  increase  in  the  complexity  of  the  justifications  with age  is  due  to  neurocognitive
development, with basic sensori-motor areas of the brain maturing earlier than higher-order
association areas that support more integrative functions (see Gogtay et al., 2004; Weisner,
1996; Jambon and Smetana, 2014; for a review see Del Giudice, 2014). Brain maturation also
underpins the further development of cognitive processes such as working memory (Bunge
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and Wright, 2007), metacognition, and theory of mind, which may be necessary for children
to be able to provide some justifications. Finally we must note that a general increase of
language ability may also play a role in the increase of the number of categories with age,
particularly when examining changes from ages 4 to 6, where we saw a significant drop in
basic  liking in  favor  of  more specific  justifications  that  may be harder  for  children  with
limited language abilities to articulate. 
One key category that increased significantly in frequency from age 6 to 8 was understanding
and  interpretation.  Schabmann  et  al.  (2015)  also  showed  a  greater  drive  towards
understanding and interpretation in their older age group, and our results corroborate the view
that understanding plays an important role in aesthetic appreciation (Leder et al., 2004) but
also suggest that this drive for meaning follows a particular time-course which may depend
on levels of neurocognitive development, as well as possible influences of experience. 
We found significant increases in the recognition of the role of the artist as an agent, namely
between ages 4 and 6, and again between ages 6 and 8. In previous research, the ability to
consider the role and intentions of the artist has been found to occur in 5- and 7-year-olds and
coincides  with  the  development  of  Theory  of  Mind (Callaghan  and  Rochat,  2003).  It  is
notable that reference to the artist increased significantly twice, suggesting that, unlike formal
TOM tests which categorize pass (as opposed to fail) on false belief at around age 4 (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985), the spontaneous use of interpretations that testify to a Theory of Mind
continue to increase beyond that stage (see also Lagattuta et al., 2015; Keysar et al., 2003). It
is also around the age of 7 that children develop an interpretive Theory of Mind (i-TOM)
which is  the  understanding that  the  same picture  can  be perceived  differently  by people
(Carpendale and Chandler,  1996) and this  may also have been reflected in the children’s
increased focus on the intentions of the artist. Such interpretations are in line the view that
there  is  a  general  widening  of  perspective-taking  ability  and  reduction  in  egocentrism
(Parsons et  al.,  1978).  As judgment  decenters  and becomes less  egocentric,  children  can
develop a broader, more abstract cognitive style that is associated with expert aesthetic taste
(Child, 1965).
It is interesting to note that children at age 10 started using the justification of perceptual
fluency, i.e. the experience of the effort of perceiving the artwork (see Reber et al., 1998).
This points to a high degree of introspection and metacognitive awareness, as these abilities
are necessary for the children to be able to relate their ease of processing the artwork to their
level of appreciation. This makes its recognition as a reason for liking artworks by relatively
young children quite remarkable. We must add that it was rare for children to articulate this,
but it is nevertheless noteworthy that they did at all. It is possible that this is connected to a
concept  worthy  of  further  research,  namely  that  of  conceptual  fluency  (Alter  and
Oppenheimer, 2009), which refers to the ease with which meaning can be gleaned from an
entity (in our case, an artwork). Paradoxically, it has been observed that adult viewers who
have more experience with artwork may value a lack of conceptual fluency (Belke et al.,
2015). It would be interesting to study at which time this may onset at slightly later stages of
development, as it is conceivable that this may begin during adolescence.
In our study children did not give emotion as a frequent justification (on average 4% overall),
and when they did it was significantly more for representational than abstract art, perhaps due
to the higher inclusion of facial expressions where emotion is portrayed literally, and thus is
more easily understood (Ives, 1984; Jolley et al., 2004). While this significant difference is
predicted by association theory, the low level of usage runs counter to the central role that
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emotions are believed to have in the aesthetic experience  (Cupchik and Laszlo, 1992; Leder
et al., 2004; Belke et al., 2010; Else et al., 2015). Moreover, Schabmann et al. (2015) found
emotion was important in aesthetic evaluations at all ages but more so for younger children,
with older children’s  evaluation becoming increasingly cognitively based and knowledge-
driven. A probable reason for this apparent discrepancy is that, in our study, any reference to
emotion  was  spontaneous,  and  just  because  children  did  not  mention  emotion  in  their
justifications, does not necessarily mean that emotions did not play a role in their evaluations.
As demonstrated  by  Schepman et  al.  (2015a),  a  participant’s  thoughts  in  response  to  an
artwork may not explicitly show any emotional content, but they do have clear and strong
emotional relevance to those individuals when they are asked to rate the valence of those
thoughts (see also Augustin et al., 2012). In Schabmann’s work the rating of emotion was
specifically elicited by a rating scale,  while in our study it  was only recorded if children
mentioned it spontaneously during their justification. We suggest, therefore, that emotions
could easily have played a role in our study but children may be less likely to report the role
of emotions spontaneously, perhaps because of lower levels of metacognition, difficulties in
articulating emotional influences (see e.g. Mayer et al., 1990; Harris, 2008) or because other
more salient influences, such as subject matter, came to mind first. For example, children as
young as five can be sensitive to emotions expressed in art if they are provided with a set of
verbal labels from which to make their decision (e.g., Carothers and Gardner, 1979; Blank et
al.,  1984)  and  while  children  may  not  spontaneously  refer  to  emotions  when  matching
pictures  on the basis  of mood until  age 11,  they can do this  at  age five when explicitly
instructed to do so (Jolley and Thomas, 1995).
To  summarize,  it  is  clear  from  the  data  that  different  justifications  follow  a  different
developmental time-course, with attributes such as color and subject matter being present at
all ages but with understanding and interpretation, perceptual fluency, and reference to the
artist  gaining  in  importance  with  increasing  age.  This  might  suggest  that  certain  basic
attributes such as color and subject matter are key to aesthetic appreciation and of primary
importance  at  all  ages,  possibly  because they  rely  less  on a  particular  level  of  cognitive
development. This developmental profile of the children’s justifications, showing a focus on
basic perceptual analysis at early ages and an increased role of cognition and understanding at
older ages, corresponds to the organization of Leder et al.’s (2004) stage model of aesthetic
experience.  Perhaps the stages of aesthetic experience described by Leder et al. (2004), have,
to  an  extent,  been  determined  by  the  stages  of  neurocognitive  development  in  children.
Young children are strongly driven by the visual properties of the artwork, features which
remain  important  at  older  ages,  but  with  increased  age  and cognitive  development  other
cognitive processes come into play,  which drive the need to understand the artwork. The
combination of complete cognitive development, and extensive experience and knowledge of
art,  enables individuals to process an artwork in different ways, attending to its structural
properties, meaning, and style, to reach a richer aesthetic experience (Winston and Cupchik,
1992; Leder et al., 2004; Cupchik et al., 2009).
Future neuroscientific studies
While it has been suggested that understanding the neural mechanisms of aesthetic processing
in  children  may  be  challenging  (see  e.g.  Nieminen  et  al.,  2011,  section  7),  our  work
documenting  reasons  given  for  the  liking  of  artwork  suggests  potential  fruitful  lines  of
investigation for future neuro-aesthetic studies. It would seem particularly useful to examine
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whether, in the viewing of abstract artworks, color-processing areas of the visual cortex are
differently engaged than in the viewing of representational artwork (see e.g. Zeki & Marini,
1998). A further fruitful line would be to examine the role of semantic processing in the
viewing of artworks, as it would seem that greater activation of visual semantic areas (e.g.
left  occipito-temporal  areas)  should  be  expected  during  the  viewing  of  representational
artworks (Rossion et al., 2000), while activation in these areas may also indicate attempts to
attribute meanings to abstract art, as demonstrated by the children in our study and in adults
by Schepman, Rodway and Pullen (2015). 
Conclusion
The results support the view that shared liking for artworks starts to emerge around 8 years of
age, for representational art only. This is compatible with observations from non-expert adult
observers (Vessel and Rubin, 2010; Schepman et al., 2015a), who also show significantly
greater convergence in liking for representational than abstract artwork. This is the first time
that this has been shown in children. The finding is compatible with an interpretation that
shared  meanings,  associations,  and  their  associated  attributions  of  positive  and  negative
valence emerge at this time. An important implication from our work is that the processes
underlying the convergence in aesthetic appreciation may have a wider role in driving shared
liking to other items in the world. Our results also show that children are able to provide
justifications for their evaluations from a very young age, but are able to do this in more
complex and sophisticated ways as they get older. As with non-expert adults, subject matter
seems to dominate justifications for representational artwork, while color and formal artistic
properties  dominate  those  for  abstract  art.  Overlaying  these  dominant  categories,  the  art
interpretations gain in richness as children get older, showing evidence of newly acquired
cognitive and meta-cognitive abilities, such as theory of mind, that are likely to be a product
of general  neurocognitive development,  with likely further  influences  from education and
cultural  exposure.  The  results  provide  a  rich  overview  of  the  influences  on  aesthetic
preference in children throughout the primary school age.
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Appendix: Artworks used in the study
A. Representational artworks
1: Kevin Heaney: Houses Granite Montana http://fineartamerica.com/featured/houses-
granite-montana-kevin-heaney.html
2: Ian Sheldon: Peeling Wallpaper http://www.fine-art.com/art-93431/ian-sheldon/peeling-
wallpaper
3: David Wade: Streamside http://dart.fine-art.com/art-29992/david-wade/streamside
4: Bruce Greene: Under the Indian Blanket http://www.fine-art.com/art-138220/bruce-
greene/under-the-indian-blanket
5: Mark Peterson: '55 T-Bird http://www.fine-art.com/art-133493/mark-peterson/%2755-t-
bird
6: Jay Kemp: Return to Sender http://www.fine-art.com/art-99020/jay-kemp/return-to-sender-
%28a/p%29
7: Sergio Zampieri: Autumn Light http://www.absolutearts.com/cgi-bin/portfolio/art/your-
art.cgi?login=sergiozampieri&title=Autumn_light-1289849983t.jpg
8: Albert Edelfelt: Boys Playing on the Shore 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Edelfelt#mediaviewer/File:Albert_Edelfelt_-
_Boys_Playing_on_the_Shore_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg
9: Jean Smith: Laugher #4 
http://jeansmithartist.com/wp-content/gallery/laughter-project/laughter4.jpg
10: Paul Dixon: Ups and Downs http://affordablebritishart.co.uk/details.php?pid=4611
B. Abstract artworks
11: Boi K' Boi: Mah Abstract Colors Niamh  http://c300221.r21.cf1.rackcdn.com/mah-
abstract-colors-niamh-1342576271_b.jpg 
12: Unknown Artist: Ode to Miro http://www.inkweb.org/gallery.htm 
13: Mystral Casterial: Kandinsky Tribute http://www.deviantart.com/art/Watercolor-
Kandinsky-tribute-175555409 
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14: Elizabeth Urabe: In God’s Hands http://www.arthit.ru/abstract/0079/abstract-art-11.html 
15: Stephanie Kordan Dardashti: Desire Red http://dart.fine-art.com/art-72046/stephanie-
kordan-dardashti/desire-red
16: Mauren Greenwood: Indulgence http://www.mpgart.co.uk/abstrIN.htm 
17: Brice Marden: Cold Mountain 
http://abstract-art.com/abstraction/l3_more_artists/ma86b_marden.html
18:  ScentOfBlood: Kandinsky Tribute http://www.deviantart.com/art/Kandinsky-Tribute-
117912491 
19:  Ingrid Claessen: Nature Green Yellow White 
http://www.ingridclaessen.nl/kunstwerk/13179584_natuur+groen+geel+wit.html#.VK5WXtk
ysow 
20: Ingrid Claessen: No4 http://www.ingridclaessen.nl/kunstwerk/14892783_no4-
100x100cm2011.html#.VK5W4Nkysow 
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Tables
Table 1. Pre-test rating means and standard deviations given by undergraduate students to the
artworks used in the main study, by art type, using a 1 – 7 scale.
Abstract Representational
Mean SD Mean SD
Attractive 3.66 .74 4.18 1.06
Colorful 4.71 1.42 4.54 1.15
Interest 3.82 .77 4.31 .66
Liking 3.85 .67 4.59 .83
Negativity/Positivity 3.99 .83 4.89 1.28
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Table 2. Means and SDs for ratings given by children in the four age groups on a scale of 1-5 
stars as a function of art type, with Z and p yielded by a Wilcoxon test for each pairwise 
comparison in the rightmost columns. Note that the Bonferroni-corrected alpha for this 
analysis was 0.0125.
Abstract Representational
Age group mean SD mean SD
Z p
(α = .0125)
4 3.37 .72 3.26 .72 -.24 .810
6 3.70 .55 3.26 .70 -2.48 .013
8 3.47 .67 3.49 .58 -.20 .844
10 3.30 .67 3.76 .58 -2.20 .028
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Table  3.  Final  14 coding categories  with brief  descriptions  and a  sample  quote  for  each
category.
Category Description
Formal Artistic 
Properties
Any reference to the formal artistic properties of the artwork such as 
line, composition or style. “I don't really like how it's set out.”
Color Any reference to the colors used in the artwork. This could be simple 
naming or counting of colors (or any reference to color as a means to 
create, form or express in the artwork).  “Because I like all the yellow 
bits over there.”
Artist Any reference to the person who created the artwork either directly or 
indirectly. This could include reference to the artist as an intentional 
creator of the artwork or to the technical skill, ability or proficiency of 
the artist. “I like how they have made the water go back and make the 
shadows of the dog and not just a squiggle.”
Subject Matter Any simple reference to, or statement of, the content or subject matter 
of the artwork including objects, events or activities that are formally 
represented. “Because it's got fish in it. I don't like fish.”
Associations Any justification where a connection or link is made between the 
artwork and the participants own personal life, experience or memories.
“Because it reminds me of one of my friends. It actually looks really 
like her. She giggles a lot and is laughing all the time.”
Understanding / 
Interpretation
Any reference to comprehending (or lack of comprehension) of the 
artwork or any aspects of it, or any attempt to try to interpret the 
meaning of the artwork or to build an explanatory narrative for it. “I 
don’t know what it’s supposed to be”.
Mood / Emotion Any reference to feeling, state of mind or prevailing tone of the artwork
and its subject matter, or relating to the viewer or artist. “Because she 
looks happy.”
Interest Any reference to basic interest in the artwork, or the artwork 
commanding attention or attracting curiosity. “It looks quite 
interesting.”
Function Any suggestion on the practical usage of the artwork. “Well, I would 
see it on display but not at an art gallery.”
Comparison Any preferences which are justified through comparison (for example, 
to other artworks in the stimuli set, or to previous scores given by the 
participant). “It's good but it’s not the best of all the drawings.”
History / Culture Any preferences which are explained or justified by relating the artwork
or anything in it to culture or history. “That's like in the building where 
the earthquake struck Kefalonia.”
Perceptual Fluency Any reference to the ease, difficulty or speed at which the information 
in the artwork can be processed. “You can see what it is at a glance.”
Basic liking Any basic reference to liking or disliking the picture without 
elaboration or reference to any other theme. “Because I like it.”
Other Any preferences given which are not accounted for by the above 
themes . “I don't have a reason I just think it's three.”
Table 4. Frequency of occurrence (in percentages of the total number of opportunities) of the
14 coding categories; separated for abstract and representational art, with A = Abstract, R =
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Representational,  and  4,  6,  8  and  10  referring  to  age  groups.  Overall  mean  frequencies
collapsing over age groups and art type are in the final column.
A4 R4 A6 R6 A8 R8 A10 R10 Overall
Formal Artistic Properties 25 3.5 36 24.5 63 43 65.5 47.5 38.5
Color 42 11 49 13.5 58 17 57.5 21.5 33.7
Artist 0 0 2.5 1.5 12 9.5 13 11 6.2
Subject Matter 17 73.5 17 67.5 24 68.5 12 66.5 43.3
Associations 7 11.5 6.5 9.5 5 19.5 2 11 9.0
Understanding/ Interpretation 1.5 4 6.5 7.5 17.
5
17.5 23.5 16 11.8
Mood Emotion 1.5 4.5 2 4 1 5 0.5 13 4.0
Interest 0 0.5 2.5 4 4.5 5.5 10.5 7.5 4.4
Function 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0.2
Comparison 0 0 0 0 8 3 4 6 2.7
History Culture 0 2 0 4.5 0 4 0 2 1.6
Perceptual Fluency 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2.5 0.8
Basic Liking 13.
5
11.5 4 5 2 1 0 0.5 4.7
Other 7 4.5 2 3 1 1.5 0.5 0 2.5
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Figures:
Figure 1: Mean correlation coefficients expressing the level of cross-rater convergence in star
ratings, by age group and art type, with standard error of the means indicated as bars.
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Figure 2: Frequency of occurrence (in percentages of the total number of opportunities) of the
5 most prominent coding categories; separated for abstract and representational art, with four,
six, eight and ten referring to age groups. 
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Figure 3:  Mean use of the justification categories by art type, collapsing across age groups, 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of opportunities.
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